The Enterprise Act 2002: Past, Present & Future by, Shajib Mahmood Alam, Barrister of Lincolns Inn

Preamble The administration procedure is designed to hold a business together while plans are formed either to put in place a financial restructuring to rescue the company, or to sell the business and assets to produce a better result for creditors than a liquidation.1 Before the Enterprise Act 2002 (hereafter ‘EA 2002’) came into force, administrative receivership was the preferred mode o debt enforcement against distressed companies by banks holding fixed and floating charges over substantially the entire estate of the debtor.2 This was seen as too detrimental to the interests of the unsecured creditors and businesses. The Insolvency Act 1986 as an alternative to receivership was the first legislation to introduce the administration procedure. The beauty of Administration as an insolvency modus operandi is that it comes with a moratorium on creditor enforcement actions thereby giving the company the necessary breathing space to allow the objectives of the procedure to be

1 Conway, L.. (2012). “Company Rescue Procedures”. p.2 [Online] Available: http://data.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/PublisherService.svc/briefingpapers/SN04885.pdf. [Last Accessed 10/04/12]

2 Insolvency act 1986, section 29(2) cited at Mokal R.J., (2004). “The Harm Done by Administrative Receivership”. p.1 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=568702 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.568702 [Last Accessed 10/04/12] Page 2 of 23 achieved.3 The EA 2002 practically re-wrote the law on administration by replacing the entirety of Pt II of the Insolvency Act 1986.4 Some commentators share the view that the EA 2002 revolutionised the UK insolvency regime.5 Mokal et al agrees, but argues that it has been a relatively quiet one.6 Vanessa Finch on the other hand is more optimistic, she believes that the EA 2002 is a sign that corporate and creditor practice in the UK has moved from a focus on ex post responses to corporate crises to one that increasingly involves influencing the way that corporate actors manage the risks of insolvency ex ante.7 The new administration procedure has received mixed to negative reviews by academics and professionals alike. Despite her support for the new-Act, Finch observes that that the current approaches fail to provide the rescue procedure that modern restructurings really require because they 3 McCormack, G., (2009). “Rescuing small businesses: designing an “efficient” legal regime”. J.B.L. 4, p.301. Available from Westlaw. [Last Accessed 10/04/12] 4 Milman, D., (2004). “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue”. Conveyancer and Property Lawyer. Mar/Apr, p.104. Available from WestLaw. [Last Accessed 10/04/12] 5 Mokal, R. (2006) “Administrative Receivership and Administration – An Analysis” Bepress Legal Series.Working Paper 1372. p.3 Available at: http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1372 [Last Accessed 10/04/12] 6 ibid. 7 Finch, V., (2008). “Corporate rescue in a world of debt”. Journal of Business Law. 8, p.756. Available from WestLaw. [Last Accessed 10/04/12] address an outdated set of challenges.8 More argument on this criticism is presented in the final part of this paper (sections 3.1 & 3.3). This paper will keep the new Administration procedure at the heart of its study. Despite there being questions and controversies surrounding matters such as fairness, accountability and efficiency and some well argued thoughts against the abolition of receivership, the primary focus of this essay will be to discuss the extent to which the new administration regime under EA enables companies (if at all) to restructure themselves, both in contrast to the old regime and in regards to the current economic climate. Furthermore, the last part of this essay will consist of various reform proposals put forward by legal and political personnel.

Part I

Although the aim of this paper is to analyse the new Administration procedure, an effective analysis of it demands at least a brief discussion about the previous regime.

1.1 Background – A general overview and the case against Receivership

There is no arguing that when a company becomes insolvent, that economic condition and the legal response to it will inevitably impact upon the position 8 ibid., p.773 of those parties wishing to enforce either property rights or merely contractual expectations against that company.9 In the case of liquidation, for instance, the justification for such disruption is based upon collectivism; the assets of the company are realised in a fashion that generally denies a ‘smash and grab’ exercise by any one stakeholder.10 The receivership process discussed above is different, however, in that the enforcement rights of one party may effectively be defeated because another stakeholder with a superior entitlement has asserted that right by enforcing that prior security.11 Additionally, it is worth mentioning that the receiver – while regarded as the debtor’s agent – owed his primary obligations to the chargee.12 The primary purpose of floating charge receivership can be seen as having been to provide the maximum prospect for the secured creditor of recouping its claim out of such value as remained in the company by the time of crystallisation. Fletcher elaborates on this note by pointing out that the concept of ‘corporate rescue’ formed no part of the original blueprint of for receivership, and neither the appointing creditor nor the appointee were under any duty towards the company, as a defaulting

9 Milman, D., (2004). op. cit. note 4, at p.89 10 ibid. 11 ibid. 12 Mokal, R.J., (2004). op. cit. note 1

mortgagor, to seek an optimum outcome from the latter’s point of view.13 Creditors have the perception that such a process is only fair because it allows the secured creditor could assert his bargained-for advantage and effectively foreclose on any prospects for the pursuit of an explicitly collective solution to the corporate crisis.14 However, the Government along with several critics did not share this view. As has been mentioned in the parliamentary debates that preceded the Act, the then Labour Government viewed the process as not giving troubled but viable companies or businesses a sufficient chance to be rescued and accused it of undermining the interests of junior creditors.

While holders of floating charges created prior to September 15, 2003 will retain the right to appoint administrative receivers in the future, holders of post-Act floating charges will no longer be able to do so unless their security falls within one of the small number of exceptions.15 13Fletcher, I.F. (2004). “UK corporate rescue: recent developments – changes to administrative receivership, administration, and company voluntary arrangements – the Insolvency Act 2000, the White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002”. European Business Organization Law Review. 5 (1), pp.123. Available from Westlaw. [Last Accessed 10/04/12] 14 ibid., p.124 15 West, I. & Miller, R. (2004). “Enterprise Act 2002: issues for secured lenders”. Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation. 19 (3), pp.88. Available from Westlaw. [Last Accessed 10/04/12]

Part II : The obsession with rescue

The obsession of UK corporate insolvency law with the promotion of rescue is of recent origin.16 Observers and academics will agree that the idea of corporate rehabilitation in the UK is a relatively new but prominent feature of the law. By agreeing to the provisions in the Enterprise Bill and by restricting the use of administrative receivership, the Parliament accepted the need for a modern and workable company rescue regime throughout the UK.17 As McCormack suggests, the statute should be viewed in the context of the late 1990s economic boom that was fuelled by the technology and Internet sectors.18 At the same time however, the government feared a return of the economic downturn and recession of the early 1990s.19 Harry Rajak et al praised the then Labour Government for seeking out a middle ground between the old insolvency regime in the UK and the US chapter 11 in drafting the new
16 Milman, D., (2004), op. cit. note 4, at p.91 17 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Sewel/FirstSession/Enterprise 18 McCormack, G., (2008). “Corporate Rescue Law – An Anglo-American Perspective”. 1st ed. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. p.43 19 ibid. p.44
Act.20 Nevertheless, whether that was the correct approach is still debated to this day.

2.1 Administration – Major Changes

England and Wales now have a streamlined administration procedure, which is thought to have strengthened the rescue culture. It was the intention of the legislature to facilitate the rescue of viable companies and where that is not possible to achieve a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole and provide certainty and fairness to creditors and other stakeholders.21

Underlying the revised administration procedure appears to be the principle that if there are ‘alternative courses of action, one of which will benefit creditors only, and another which, with little delay, will confer benefits on employees and shareholders without significant detriment to the creditors then it is a legitimate function of insolvency law to have regard to those wider interests’.22 Furthermore, in addition to the restriction of receivership and streamlining administration procedure, Crown’s preferential position was 20 Rajak, H., (2003). “The Enterprise Act and insolvency law reform”. Company Lawyer. 24 (1), p.3. Available from WestLaw. [Last Accessed 10/04/12] 21 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Sewel/FirstSession/Enterprise 22 Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, Roy Goode, p 45 as cited in McCormack (2008) op. cit. note 18, p.39 abolished in order to promote a more equitable distribution of assets within all insolvencies.23
With so much that was done, there are still academics like Keay who argues that at the outset, administration is not a rescue procedure per se.24 He argues that it is a shelter regime, and can be viewed as a preliminary regime to possible rescue, but a rescue process might not follow from an administration process.25
Despite being obvious, it is necessary to point out after the discussions above that the then legislature viewed administration as a rescue procedure and therefore crowned it as the primary rescue procedure. However, it has to be seen whether the new procedure is actually, what its statutory description says it is. 23 The Insolvency Service (2008). “Enterprise Act 2002 – Corporate Insolvency Provisions: Evaluation Report”. pp.09 [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.insolvency.gov.uk. [Last Accessed 10/04/2012]. 24 Keay, A., (2008). “A comparative analysis of Administration in Australia and the United Kingdom”. In: Paul J. Omar (ed), International Insolvency Law : Themes and Perspectives. 1st ed. Ashgate. pp.106. 25 ibid. Riz Mokal argues that there are Insolvency Practitioners and academics out there who still perceive that the new administration procedure introduced by the Enterprise Act merely disguises administrative receivership so as to render it more generally acceptable.26 They think that while requiring them to jump through some additional but merely formal hoops, the statute benignly allows them to conduct business as usual under the new name.27

2.2 Administration as a rescue mechanism

There is no doubt in the academic and legal community that the procedural changes introduced made Administration more appealing to creditors.28 Figures support the argument that the EA has been successful in promoting administration as the primary insolvency procedure. The number of annual administration rose from 649 in 2002-3 to 2,661 in 2005-6 at a time when total numbers of corporate insolvencies dropped slightly (from 17,810 to 16,907) and this represented a rise in administration as the procedure employed in instances of insolvency from 3.6% to 15.7% and to 17.2% in the first quarter of 2007.29 Receiverships, in the same period fell from 1,310 to 565.30
The new 26 Mokal R.J., (2006). op. cit. note 5 27 ibid. 28 Linklater, L., (2003). “The Enterprise Act: fulfilling great expectations”. Company Lawyer. 24 (8), pp.225. Available from WestLaw [last accessed: 05/04/12] 29 Insolvency service evaluation 2008 as cited in Finch, V. (2009) op. cit. note 27 pp.392 Page 10 of 23 non-court order entry routes to administration are being widely used and court appointments are sought in a minority of cases.31 One other reason why administration has been so popular is probably the fact that on an average, administrations are completed in less time than administrative receiverships and the average duration of administration has fallen significantly due to the time limit of 1 year imposed by the EA.32
As mentioned before, the primary objective of any administration is to rescue the company as a going concern, which in practice is perhaps most likely to be achieved under a CVA or scheme of arrangement,33 and only where that is not reasonably practical or where it would not provide the best result for creditors, should the second objective (“achieving a better result”) be pursued.34 Similarly, if the first or second objectives cannot reasonably be achieved or would not be in the interests of creditors, then the third purpose (“realising property”) may be followed.35 The statute clearly has a different language and at least superficially, the administrator has a different set of functions to
30 Finch, V., (2009). “Corporate Insolvency Law”. 2nd ed. : CUP. at pp. 392 31 “Enterprise Act 2002-Corporate Insolvency Provisions: Evaluation Report”, (2008) op. cit. note 23, at pp.13 32 ibid. 33 ibid. at pp. 85 34 ibid. 35 ibid.
perform than the old style administrative receiver.36 Nevertheless, as McCormack points out, one of the main functions of administration is still making distributions to secured and preferential creditors.37 McCormack fears that if this is done and the appointor is a floating charge holder, then the similarities between administration and old-style administrative receivership seems very strong.38

2.3 Administration – Does it really allow companies to restructure themselves?

The Insolvency Service’s conclusion as to whether the new procedure conduces rescue, is that the overall outcomes of administrations, in terms of corporate and business rescue, appear to be largely unchanged from those associated with administrative receivership and there appear to be proportionately fewer ‘rescues’ than under the previous administration regime – though more in absolute numbers.39
Dr. Sandra Frisby undertook a detailed research to examine the effect of EA 2002 on insolvency outcomes. In her report, over half of the administrations in 36 McCormack, G., (2008). op. cit. note 18, at p.68 37 ibid. 38 ibid. 39
“Enterprise Act 2002-Corporate Insolvency Provisions: Evaluation Report”, (2008) op. cit. note 23, at p.5 the sample resulted in an asset sale and the inevitable demise of the company itself and of its underlying business.40 Going concern sales of the whole business accounted for just over one third of the companies in the sample, and going concern sales of a part of the business for a further 6%.41 Corporate rescue outcomes are rare in the extreme, accounting for marginally over 4% of the entire sample.42 In 32 of the cases recorded as a rescue, there was in fact a CVA ongoing, and these were all fairly recent cases.43
The reasons why receivership was abolished have already been mentioned and with that information in mind, perhaps the most salient remark in Frisby’s research was the startling similarity between the performance of receivership and administration.44 There are no true rescue outcomes recorded for receivership, there being only one case out of the entire sample and this is anomalous in that the case in question lasted three weeks, at the end of which time the company’s owners discharged the secured debt.45 Otherwise, there
40 Frisby, S. (2006). “Report on Insolvency Outcomes”. p.58 [Online] available at http://www.insolvency.co.uk 41 ibid. 42 ibid. 43 ibid. 44 ibid. at p.59 45 ibid. Page 13 of 23 appeared to be no discernible difference in the frequency of outcomes between receivership and administration.46

Part III : Diagnosing Administration – Search for a cure

3.1 The case for a DIP system

In the green paper, the Government stated its aim was to encourage and rescue unlucky entrepreneurs. It is quite an irony then that the new regime introduces a system that hands over all directorial power to an outsider with the discretion to remove the incumbents.
In the UK, control of the rescue has been placed principally in the hand of – the insolvency practitioner – who acts as the administrator.47 Undeniably, the directors of a company are more likely to be those who have the greatest knowledge about the company’s business and markets (at least in lost cases if not all).48 Furthermore, as Armour & Mokal points out, the concentration of
46 ibid. 47 Finch, V. (2005). “Control and co-ordination in corporate rescue”. Legal studies, 25 (3). pp. 374. Available from : http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/16796/ [Last Accessed 10/04/12] 48 Armour, J. & Mokal, R.J, (2004). “Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002”. ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working managerial power in the hands of specialist agents – in healthy companies, board of directors – is a fundamental feature of corporate law.49 Administration has been criticised for the focus that it places on control by the insolvency practitioner on the process of rescue and reconstruction.50 Schedule B1, Para. 62(1) states that a company in administration or an officer of a company in administration may not exercise a management power without the consent of the administrator. Furthermore, unlike the US position, secured creditors cannot be ‘crammed down’ and compelled to accept reorganisation plan against their wishes.51 Nor does the EA provide a US style mechanism for financing companies in financial difficulties.52
Before the last general election the Conservative party proposed to create a new fast-track judicial process for distressed companies, as an alternative to administration, based on the best aspects of the American Chapter 11
Paper No. 288. p.13 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=567306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.567306 [Last Accessed 10/04/12] 49 PL Davies (2002) as cited in ibid, p.23 50 Goldring, J. & Philips, M., (2002). “Rescue and reconstruction”. Insolvency Intelligence. 15 (10), pp.77. Available from WestLaw. [Last Accessed 10/04/12] 51 McCormack ‘’Super-priority new financing and corporate rescue’’ 2007 J.B.L as cited in Finch, V., (2009) op. cit. note 30 at pp.384 52 Finch, V., (2009) op. cit. note 30 at pp.384 system.53
The current Prime Minister, David Cameron, rather strongly argued at that time that this would create a breathing space to allow company directors to formulate a plan to rescue or restructure the company.54 It is envisaged that prima facie the management would retain control in a Debtor in Possession (DIP) model.55
However, the DIP system has its critiques. Where the company becomes factually insolvent, creditors displace shareholders as ‘residual claimants’ – in other words, they capture the benefit or suffer the loss from any increase or decrease in the firm’s total value.56 Armour and Mokal argues that, at this point, it no longer makes sense for the board of directors to manage the company on behalf of the shareholders.57 Administration does not ipso facto terminate the board’s appointment, but rather gives control over their 53 Cameron, D. (2008). “Speech to the CBI”. [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2008/07/David_Cameron_Speech_to_the_ CBI.aspx. [Last Accessed 02/04/2012]. 54 ibid. 55 Tribe, J. (2009). “The Reform of UK Corporate Insolvency Laws: CVAs, the Conservatives and Chapter 11”. International Accountant. 2009(47). p.4 [ONLINE] Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410693. [Last Accessed 10/04/12] 56 Armour, J. & Mokal, R.J, (2002). op. cit. note 48, p.12 57 ibid. Page 16 of 23 appointment and removal, and the scope of their management jurisdiction to the administrator.58

3.2 Funding Rescue

A further aspect of timely rescue is the availability of funds for the purposes of recovery and Finch correctly points out that one of the problems of the current regime is that the EA failed to provide for a regime of ‘super-priority’ funding for administration.59 Although this was proposed during the House of Lords debates on the Enterprise Bill, the Government rather dubiously decided to reject such a suggestion.60 Unlike administration, receivership offered certain encouragements for banks’ to finance rescues – it gave them a power of veto over administrations.61 The banks’ power in such respects has been weakened
58 ibid., p.13 59 Finch, V., (2009) op. cit. note 30, at pp.404 60 Finch, V., (2003). “Re-invigorating corporate rescue”. Journal of Business Law. November, pp.538. Available from WestLaw. [last accessed: 10/05/12] 61 ibid. Page 17 of 23 by the EA reforms and in the long run, this will inevitably reduce incentives to fund rescue attempts.62
Additionally, The Insolvency Service proposed, that in case super priority funding itself were not enough to attract rescue finance for a viable company in administration, the administrator should be able to secure new postinsolvency financing against any property which is not already encumbered by a fixed security.63

3.3 The case for supervised restructuring

At this point, this paper will argue that the new administration procedure is, in reality, old hat: that it addresses an outdated set of challenges; that it does not provide the rescue procedure that modern restructurings really require; and that there is a need to move to a regime of cram-down and court supervision.64 Arguing in the same line as Finch, the European High Yield Association (EHYA) suggests that there is a need for a court-supervised restructuring process that
62 Finch, V., (2009). op. cit. note 30 63 Insolvency Service consults on encouraging company rescue. (2009). [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/compr esc/compresc09.pdf. [Last Accessed 13/04/12]. 64 Finch (2009) op. cit. note 30, at pp.418 includes a stay on enforcement actions, including a ban on the exercise of staytriggered contract termination provisions by suppliers and customers (as found in the US and France); judicial resolution of valuation disputes; and a system of cram-down to prevent those without an economic interest from frustrating the proceedings.65 It argues that when a company is in administration, this would, inter alia, restrict the vetoing of a restructuring plan by those shareholders and creditors who no longer have economic interests in the company.66 While this paper acknowledges that there are possible downsides to the suggestions mentioned above, the critics are not addressed at this time due to the constraints under which this paper has to be written.

Conclusion – The way forward

In light of the above research, it can be safely stated that the new act failed to make a good first impression and sufficient evidence has been provided above to support such argument. Figures suggest that the new-Act has led to a large number of new firms and practitioners taking administration appointments.67 Frisby points out that despite being very successful in reducing the duration of
65 Finch, V., (2008). op. cit. note 7 66 ibid., p.774 67 Frisby, S. (2006) op. cit. note 40, at p.82 Page 19 of 23 administrations, the Enterprise Act does not appear to have had any real impact on the incidence of corporate rescue in England and Wales.68
Although one of the motivating factors behind the reforms brought into effect in 2003 was the desire to emulate the ‘spirit of enterprise’ which had been deemed to be characteristic of the bankruptcy laws and business ethos of the United States, the reforms as enacted offer no indication of a movement towards the development of a ‘US Chapter-11’-style rescue procedure with its typically debtor –friendly features.69 The general consensus in Sandra Frisby’s interview data reflected the view that, at least to a certain extent the EA has achieved its objectives to promote a rescue culture. It has made people think about things differently, it has probably changed the perception as to what goes on and it has certainly given more control to the directors and other stakeholders apart from secured creditors.70
In its report preceding the 1985-1986 legislation, the Cork Committee criticised the Crown’s preferential status.71 It took nearly 20 years for the Parliament to
68 ibid. 69 Fletcher I.F., (2004). op. cit. note 13, at p.151 70 Frisby, S. (2006). op. cit. note 40, at pp.66 71 Linklater, L., (2003) op. cit. note 28, p.5 Page 20 of 23 abolish the Crown’s preferential status. Linklater argues, rather optimistically, that the objectives underlying the Enterprise Act 2002 might take some further time to mature and become more palatable to the various interested parties before they are fully realised.72 Frisby agrees, admitting that it might be premature to judge the Enterprise Act’s overall impact based on the data she provided.73 She reminds everyone that it is only normal for legislation of this nature to go through a ‘bedding in’ period.74 Vanessa Finch is also optimistic about the future of English Insolvency regime and suggests that the way forward may not be to move to a court driven process akin to the insolvency procedures of US Ch.11 but to create the conditions that will best allow both informal and formal and insolvency practitioner-centred rescue systems to operate at lowest costs and highest effectiveness.75 This paper has already mentioned some of the proposals and promises that were made by the current Prime Minister & his party before the last general elections took place, and although we have not seen any major changes yet, it might only be a matter of time before Parliament introduces some improvements to the current regime. Some very well known high street brands are struggling in the current 72 ibid. 73 Frisby (2006) op. cit. note 40, p.82 74 ibid. 75 Finch, V., (2008). op. cit. note 7, p.776 Page 21 of 23 economic climate, and the latest casualty of the ongoing recession is Clinton Cards76, who has now been placed in administration by one of its suppliers. This has been the case for many well-known high street names (e.g. Woolworths, Zavvi, MFI etc.) and SMEs in the last few years. Arguably, the UK now has a robust and effective insolvency regime but a better rescue regime is only a demand of time in order to allow ailing businesses to thrive in the UK again.

Bibliography

Books:

i. McCormack, G., (2008). “Corporate Rescue Law – An Anglo-American Perspective”. 1st ed. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. ii. Paul J. Omar (ed) (2008), International Insolvency Law : Themes and Perspectives. 1st ed. Ashgate. iii. Finch, V., (2009). “Corporate Insolvency Law”. 2nd ed. : CUP.

Journals & other materials:

i. Conway, L.. (2012). “Company Rescue Procedures”. Available at: http://data.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/PublisherService.svc/briefingpapers/SN04885.pdf

ii. Insolvency act 1986, section 29(2) cited at Mokal R.J., (2004). “The Harm Done by Administrative Receivership”. International Corporate Rescue. 1 (4) 76 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18002413

iii. McCormack, G., (2009). “Rescuing small businesses: designing an “efficient” legal regime”. J.B.L. 4, pp.299-330

iv. Milman, D., (2004). “Moratoria on enforcement rights: revisiting corporate rescue”. Conveyancer and Property Lawyer. Mar/Apr, pp.89-108.

v. Mokal, R. (2006) “Administrative Receivership and Administration – An Analysis” Bepress Legal Series.Working Paper 1372.

vi. Finch, V., (2008). “Corporate rescue in a world of debt”. Journal of Business Law. 8, pp.756-777.

vii. Mokal, R.J., (2004). “The Harm Done by Administrative Receivership”. International Corporate Rescue. 1 (4)

viii. Fletcher, I.F. (2004). “UK corporate rescue: recent developments – changes to administrative receivership, administration, and company voluntary arrangements – the Insolvency Act 2000, the White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002”. European Business Organization Law Review. 5 (1), pp.119-151.

ix. West, I. & Miller, R. (2004). “Enterprise Act 2002: issues for secured lenders”.

Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation. 19 (3), pp.88-92.

x. Rajak, H., (2003). “The Enterprise Act and insolvency law reform”. Company

Lawyer. 24 (1). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=568702 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.568702

xi. The Insolvency Service (2008). “Enterprise Act 2002 – Corporate Insolvency Provisions: Evaluation Report”.

xii. Keay, A., (2008). “A comparative analysis of Administration in Australia and the United Kingdom”.

xiii. Linklater, L., (2003). “The Enterprise Act: fulfilling great expectations”. Company Lawyer. 24 (8), pp.225-226

xiv. Frisby, S. (2006). “Report on Insolvency Outcomes”, The Insolvency Service

xv. Finch, V. (2005). “Control and co-ordination in corporate rescue”. Legal studies, 25 (3). pp. 374-403.

xvi. Armour, J. & Mokal, R.J, (2004). “Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act 2002”. ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 288

xvii. Goldring, J. & Philips, M., (2002). “Rescue and reconstruction”. Insolvency Intelligence. 15 (10), pp.75-78.

xviii. Tribe, J. (2009). “The Reform of UK Corporate Insolvency Laws: CVAs, the Conservatives and Chapter 11”. International Accountant. 2009(47). [ONLINE] Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410693.

xix. Finch, V., (2003). “Re-invigorating corporate rescue”. Journal of Business Law. November, pp.527-557.

xx. Insolvency Service consults on encouraging company rescue. (2009).

[ONLINE] Available at: http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/compresc/compresc09.pdf